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Dissolution of Marriage: California Spousal Support
Of major importance in any dissolution action is the issue of spousal sup-
port. Since the number of family law filings in California has greatly risen,
the body of interpretive law has likewise expanded. Th.? result is a determina-
tion by the courts of the relative importance to be accorded to statutory and
equitable factors considered in awarding spousal support. The development of
a recent trend indicating that the legislature and the courts are recognizing
the ability of a divorced individual to become self-supporting has impacted
support awards. The author provides a current summary of California law
on the issue of spousal support including factors important to the judicial de-
termination of the need for and duration of temporary and permanent
spousal support.
I. INTRODUCTION
'The traditional rationale for alimony' was to affirm a husband's
obligation to support the family and to provide punishment for
wrongdoing by "reward[ing] virtue and punish[ing] sin.' 2 A wife
found guilty of marital misconduct such as cruelty, desertion, or adul-
tery could not, however, receive support, and a husband committing
similar "wrongs" could be ordered to pay alimony in retribution.
This rationale was purportedly rooted in the state's interest in family
support and providing justice for spouses who had fulfilled the obli-
gations of marriage.3
With the passage of the Family Law Act4 in 1969, California elimi-
1. Alimony has been defined as "a traditional allotment for the wife's support."
Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?,
14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 146 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Alimony Myth]. The word stems
from the Latin phrase "to nourish." At common law, while divorce was prohibited,
husbands were allowed a kind of legal separation, but were required to provide eco-
nomic support for their estranged wives. "Thus, the first rationale for traditional ali-
mony was to enforce the husband's continuing obligation for support." Id.
2. Id. A third possible rationale was to compensate a wife for labor performed by
her during the marriage. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 442 (1968). Several
estimates of the cash value of a homemaker's services have been advanced in recent
years. See generally S. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: COUPLES, LOVERS AND
THE LAW (1981), and Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts
on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976).
3. The Alimony Myth, supra note 1, at 146-47.
4. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1983). Governor Brown's Commission on
the Family, created in 1966, was determined to eliminate fault as a factor in the deter-
mination of alimony, support, and the division of community property. REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 5-6 (1966).
nated the fault theory of divorce. 5 The Act, a response to general dis-
satisfaction with the social and legal procedures affecting divorce
actions in California, effected substantial changes in the substantive
law and procedure in proceedings for dissolution of marriage.6 The
Family Law Act does not use the word "alimony" to describe the
payment from one spouse to another for amounts necessary for sup-
port and maintenance. 7 Instead, the term "spousal support" is em-
ployed to describe these payments, which are conditioned upon such
factors as the duration of the marriage and the ability of the recipient
to earn income.8 Pragmatically, spousal support now serves to deliver
economic justice based on the financial needs of the specific parties
involved in a dissolution proceeding.9 New justifications for awards
of spousal support include: "to provide support for the long-married
housewife with impaired earning capacity, to provide transitional
support for education and retraining, to provide support for the
mothers of young children, and to provide compensation for the wife
as a partner in her husband's work."10
With this rationale for the continued existence and vitality of
spousal support awards in mind, this comment will explore the fac-
tors taken into consideration by the California courts in determining
the amount of, need for, and duration of spousal support. The courts
have commenced the development of firm answers as to the weight
to be accorded to the factors mandated by statute and to other factors
deemed just and equitable under the circumstances of each particular
case.11 The difference in function and purpose between pendente
5. "Irreconcilable differences" and incurable insanity are now the sole grounds
for a dissolution of marriage in California. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, HUSBAND AND WIFE §§ 64, 67 (8th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as B. WITKIN].
6. The reasoning behind these changes, which include the elimination of fault
grounds for divorce, a reduced residency requirement, and general inadmissibility of
evidence of particular acts of misconduct against either party, is analyzed in Krom,
California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L.J. 156 (1970).
7. "This word evoked an almost automatic glandular reaction, and the resulting
accumulations of bile did nothing to ease the unhappy lot of counsel and court." In re
Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 449 n.7, 573 P.2d 41, 49 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 147
n.7 (1978) (quoting ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW ACT PRACTICE 138 § 3.1 (C.E.B.
1970)).
8. The new terminology of the Family Law Act includes the following: "divorce"
was changed to "dissolution of marriage;" "action" was changed to "proceeding;" "peti-
tion" was substituted for "complaint;" the "plaintiff" is now the "petitioner," and the
"defendant" the "respondent;" and the proceeding is entitled "In re Marriage of
"instead of "- v. -. " B. WITKIN, supra note 5, at § 16.
9. The Alimony Myth, supra note 1, at 150.
10. Id. Two early family law bills provided that "support payments were to be
based solely on the dependent spouse's need and ability to engage in gainful employ-
ment, with due regard to the duration of marriage." Krom, supra note 6, at 177.
11. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. Although a prior commentator on
this subject has noted that "it is extremely difficult to determine how California courts
might utilize the factors enumerated in Civil Code section 4801 to assess an individual's
potential or ability to become self-sustaining," recent case law does suggest the weight
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lite, or temporary, spousal support and permanent spousal support
must be recognized as affecting the propriety of any award. The re-
cent reformulation of support concepts in the Family Law Act and
recent cases seems to indicate that the law is currently recognizing
the increasing ability of divorcees to become self-supporting.
1 2
Issues relating to modification of spousal support orders also relate
to the basic support factors to be discussed herein, and are being in-
creasingly litigated. Accordingly, this comment will explore the re-
cent California decisions pertaining to modification and the issues
raised therein. It appears that California courts favor modification of
support orders despite the desire to promote self-sufficiency. This fa-
voritism is evidenced by the gradually decreasing amounts of support
actually awarded. Spousal support is a necessary and proper means
to achieve the goal of a self-supporting society.
II. PENDENTE LITE SPOUSAL SUPPORT
A. Introduction
Jurisdiction to award spousal support during the pendency of a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage is expressly conferred upon
the superior courts of the state of California.1 3 A family law action is
regarded as "pending" from the time of its commencement by filing
the petition until its final determination on appeal or until the time
for appeal has expired.'4 In addition, the existence of a valid, void, or
voidable marriage, which is a prerequisite to dissolution proceedings,
is assumed under the Family Law Act, unless that fact is chal-
lenged.1 5 The party seeking support must show the requisite marital
to be accorded to certain factors. Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need
of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L.
REV. 493, 493 (1978).
12. The Alimony Myth, supra note 1, at 148. Some proponents of no-fault divorce
assumed that all women are capable of supporting themselves adequately. See gener-
ally Brody, California's Divorce Reform: Its Sociological Implications, 1 PAC. L.J. 223
(1970).
13. Civil Code § 4357 provides, in pertinent part: "During the pendency of any pro-
ceeding ... the superior court may order the husband or wife ... to pay any amount
that is necessary for the support and maintenance of the wife or husband .... " CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4357 (West 1983). For convenience, the author will assume throughout
this comment that the party seeking support is the wife.
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4450, 4503 (West 1983).
15. 2 C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21.11 at
21-24 (1984) [hereinafter cited as C. MARKEY]. For the rules governing the existence of
a marriage for the purpose of awarding temporary support prior to the Family Law
Act, see id. at §§ 21-25 to 21-27. In Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Cal. App. 2d 117, 123,
status to achieve standing, usually via affidavit. Because the award
for support imposes a personal obligation on the party ordered to pay
it, the court must have in personam jurisdiction over that spouse to
make an order.16
Originally, an award of temporary alimony could only be made to a
wife. 17 Although the California statutes concerning support awards
were made gender-neutral in 1927,18 it was not until 1979 that the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a sex-based alimony statute
in the case entitled Orr v. Orr.19 Many states now have statutes
which expressly provide for a spousal support award to either spouse,
regardless of sex.20 Hence, a husband generally has an equal right to
both seek and receive spousal support; a denial of such right would
appear to violate the United States Constitution.
The purposes of temporary support orders are to maintain the sta-
tus quo of the parties until trial, in order to enable a spouse to live in
the same manner to which she has been accustomed until final dispo-
sition of the case, and to prevent creditor problems.2 1 Other justifica-
tions for allowing temporary support have been advanced, which
include: to preserve the family unit, to prevent diminution of the
242 P.2d 41, 45 (1952), more than prima facie proof was required where the fact of the
marriage, or its validity, was challenged.
16. All recognized bases of judicial jurisdiction in the case of natural persons are
acceptable under this requirement. LI, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA JURISDIC-
TION AND PROCESS § 1.7 (Cal. C.E.B. 1970). Additionally, these bases are identical to
those listed in 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 (1971). See also
Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976) (non-resident fa-
ther's infrequent visits insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction in marriage dis-
solution proceeding seeking support); Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100
Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972) (mere sending by non-resident father of an agreement concerning
visitation rights insufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction).
17. B. WITKIN, supra note 5, at § 131
18. See 1927 Cal. Stat. ch. 249, p. 441, § 1. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West
Supp. 1985).
19. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
20. Among these statutes are the following: ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-82 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (1981); FLA.
STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-9 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (1976); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 403.200(1) (1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.335 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42.365 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1981); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 20-
107.1 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.26 (West 1981).
21. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McNaughton, 145 Cal. App. 3d 845, 849-50, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 176, 177-78 (1983), where the court stated: "The temporary support award is usu-
ally obtained soon after the filing of the petition. . . . Its purpose is to maintain the
living conditions of the parties as closely as possible to the status quo, pending trial
and the division of the assets and obligations of the parties."
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wife's separate estate,22 and necessity.23 Hence, a supported spouse
should not be required to significantly impair or deplete his or her
separate estate pending the outcome of a dissolution of marriage.
The policy and statutory mandate requiring the parties to maintain
the status quo is based upon equitable principles, and serves to re-
mind us that a "[h]usband is not entitled to a disproportionately
higher standard of living than [a] [w]ife."24
An award of temporary support must be based upon a showing of
two conditions: the need of the supported spouse or moving party;
and the ability of the supporting spouse to pay.25 California Civil
Code section 4357, governing pendente lite spousal support, expressly
refers only to the first condition-the spouse's needs-and case law
has established that the husband's ability to pay is a necessary condi-
tion to an award of temporary support.26
When seeking support, one must therefore look to the statutory
authority for support pendente lite (including child and spousal sup-
port).27 The court's power in matters of temporary support is thus
not within the court's general equity powers, but is conferred by stat-
ute. 28 Furthermore, because the state expressly provides that
pendente lite support may be awarded during the pendency of any
22. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 111 Cal. App. 2d 529, 534, 244 P.2d 917, 920 (1952).
"Temporary awards are made solely for the purpose of preserving intact the family
and to prevent diminution of the wife's separate estate as, nearly as practicable, until
the chancellor shall finally determine whether either party be entitled to any relief in
equity." Id.
23. Loeb v. Loeb, 84 Cal. App. 2d 141, 146, 190 P.2d 246, 249 (1948) (necessity is a
necessary basis for both a temporary and permanent allowance).
24. In re Marriage of McNaughton, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
See also Mauldin v. Mauldin, 275 P.2d 113 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (wife not required
to drain her separate estate to live in accustomed style, or to exhaust community funds
in her possession before demanding support from her husband); Larsen v. Larsen, 101
Cal. App. 2d 862, 226 P.2d 650 (1951) (wife is entitled to live in customary manner per
her station in life); Whelan v. Whelan, 87 Cal. App. 2d 690, 197 P.2d 361 (1948) (wife
not required first to impair separate estate capital before she is entitled to alimony
pendente lite); and Falk v. Falk, 48 Cal. App. 2d 780, 120 P.2d 724 (1941) (wife should
not have to unduly curtail expenses or to deprive herself of the necessities of life pend-
ing divorce).
25. B. WITKIN, supra note 5, at § 139. The court will, therefore, examine all of the
circumstances of the parties when deciding temporary spousal support issues. Id,
26. Arnold v. Arnold, 215 Cal. 613, 12 P.2d 435 (1932) (award made without consid-
eration of the financial ability of the husband is improper); Wilder v. Wilder, 214 Cal.
783, 7 P.2d 1032 (1932) (award denied to wife whose husband was insolvent and wife
had adequate resources for support).
27. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28. The language of the statute indicates that the temporary support award is
clearly discretionary. See supra note 13.
proceeding under the Family Law Act, a spouse may be entitled to
such support on an appeal from a dissolution proceeding. 29
Generally, temporary spousal support is sought by the moving
party soon after the filing of the Petition for Dissolution of Mar-
riage. 30 Although earlier opinions suggest that an award of tempo-
rary "alimony" could be made ex parte, the modern practice is to
seek the award of support only on noticed motion or in an Order to
Show Cause hearing. The application for temporary support is, how-
ever, an independent collateral proceeding. Therefore, an order
granting or denying support is appealable. 31
B. The Supported Spouse's Needs
The propriety of pendente lite support awards to a spouse turns
primarily upon that spouse's sufficient showing of need. 32 The ques-
tion of the propriety of pendente lite support is a matter which rests
in the sound discretion of the trial court.33 This discretion is subject
to the caveat that it cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner.34
An abuse of discretion will be found where, all circumstances being
considered, the court's order exceeds the bounds of reason.35 Each
case turns upon its own facts, and the trial court must have detailed
information as to both the needs of the spouse requesting support
and the available resources and cash of the other spouse.
In assessing the needs of the supported spouse, the court must
judge reasonable needs in terms of the parties' standard of living
prior to separation.36 The context thus becomes an important consid-
eration. Evidence of a spouse's personal expenses is generally used to
demonstrate need;3 7 however, a comparison to that spouse's income
29. See Bain v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d 804, 111 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1974) (wife
entitled to temporary support pending appeal, regardless of issues appealed, where she
could be deprived of the benefits of the trial court's judgment).
30. B. WITKIN, supra note 5, at § 133. The typical award is made on an order to
show cause hearing. Id. A Form 1285.50 (Income and Expense Declaration) must be
filed in the superior court for this purpose in order to define what the needs and abil-
ity to pay of the respective spouses are. See CAL. CT. R., tit. 4, Div. I, Rule 1285.50.
31. In re Marriage of Skelley, 18 Cal. 3d 365, 368, 556 P.2d 297, 299, 134 Cal. Rptr.
197, 199 (1976). See also Lincoln v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 2d 304, 139 P.2d 13 (1943)
(order denying support appealed); Robbins v. Mulcrevy, 101 Cal. App. 300, 281 P. 668
(1929) (order granting temporary alimony appealed).
32. Loeb v. Loeb, 84 Cal. App. 2d 141, 146, 190 P.2d 246, 249 (1948).
33. Id. at 148, 190 P.2d at 250.
34. Avnet v. Bank of America, 232 Cal. App. 2d 191, 200, 42 Cal. Rptr. 616, 622
(1965) (award to wife affirmed on the basis that issue of validity of marriage is not to
be determined finally in pendente lite hearing).
35. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 114, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 72 (1974).
36. In re Marriage of Siegel, 26 Cal. App. 3d 88, 92, 102 Cal. Rptr. 613, 615 (1972).
Reasonable needs must, however, include more than "bare necessities." Id.
37. Monetary figures of claimed needs will be presented to the court in the finan-
cial declarations filed by the parties pursuant to the California Rules of Court, Rule
1285.50. See supra note 30. Counsel should also obtain and make available to the court
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must be made to insure that there truly is a need for spousal support.
The burden of showing need is, of course, on the party seeking sup-
port. Exact monetary accuracy as to need is not required at this stage
in the proceedings. A party must only make a showing of reasonable
need on which the court can determine approximately what the
needs of the spouse are. 38
Reasonable needs include, but are not limited to: "rent or mortgage
payments, real property taxes and insurance, food, household sup-
plies, utilities, medical and dental care, clothing, [and] entertain-
ment."39 Typically, the client is asked to fill out a worksheet based
on check registers, bills and receipts detailing his or her actual ex-
penses. Receipts and other documents reflecting actual expenses are
generally necessary in court only if the alleged expenses are chal-
lenged by the party opposing support, or if there is insufficient
money available to cover the alleged needs of a spouse so that the
amount of support requested simply cannot be awarded.40 Often a
couple, upon separation, cannot maintain two households in the same
style of living as they maintained only one household in the past.
Practical considerations such as this will be taken into account by the
court in determining the amount of a temporary support award.
The spouse seeking support must also demonstrate that his or her
income is insufficient to cover the expenses listed on the financial
declaration. Only then will there be a genuine need for supplemental
monies for support and maintenance. Income will include money
from all sources, whether from employment, separate property, gift
or inheritance. If the party seeking support does not have income ad-
equate for her reasonable needs, she may be and probably will be en-
titled to an award--even though she may possess substantial non-
income-producing separate property. 41 This concept of allowing a
wife to receive support notwithstanding the possession of valuable
property has been entitled the "rule of no impairment:" the spouse
need not impair or dispose of capital in order to live in her accus-
any and all documents such as bills and receipts to substantiate the claim of need and/
or inability to pay. Discovery proceedings in the family law are now covered by the
civil law and motion rules. CAL. CT. R., tit. 2, div. II, rule 301.
38. Zinke v. Zinke, 212 Cal. App. 2d 379, 385, 28 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1963).
39. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.15[l], 21-30.
40. Id.
41. See Whelan v. Whelan, 87 Cal. App. 2d 690, 197 P.2d 361 (1948) (wife had prop-
erty worth $6,170.00 and received support); Westphal v. Westphal, 122 Cal. App. 379, 10
P.2d 119 (1932) (wife with separate property valued at $15,000.00 awarded alimony).
tomed manner pending resolution of the action.42 The rule does not,
however, apply in all situations. Where the spouse seeking support
does not demonstrate the requisite need, she will not be entitled to
support. As a result, she must dip into separate property income or
earnings to maintain self-sufficiency during the pendency of the di-
vorce action. In Loeb v. Loeb,43 for example, the wife had a separate
estate worth over $200,000.00, a separate income of over $9,000.00 per
year, and annual living expenses under $8,000.00. There, the court
held that an award of $500.00 per month temporary alimony was an
abuse of discretion, as the wife had income sufficient to provide for
her needs. 44 As discussed below, the distinction between income-pro-
ducing and non-income-producing assets and/or property is one
which must be made in a support proceeding.
The "need" test for temporary support is that the spouse seeking
support must have expenses which exceed her income, her expenses
must be reasonable, and income from all sources must be provided.
From this information, the court will make a factual determination
of practical necessity and award support accordingly. The order will
attempt to maintain the status quo to alleviate the possible economic
trauma of legal separation, and should provide the needy spouse with
enough money to cover more than the "bare necessities" of life. The
cases cited herein indicate that the courts are closely scrutinizing the
claimed needs of the spouse seeking support, and one should there-
fore prepare the financial declarations by using receipts, and other
documents directly evidencing the income and expenses of the client.
C. Ability to Pay
The other prong of the test for temporary spousal support is that
the court must find that the party from whom support is sought has
the ability to pay the requested and/or proper support. This condi-
tion is judicially created, and is well-established by the case law on
the subject.4 5 Although support orders are usually based on a party's
present income, a determination of a spouse's ability to earn income
may be made. This is especially true where a spouse deliberately at-
tempts to avoid his familial support obligations by intentionally sup-
pressing income.4 6 The rule allowing consideration of ability to earn
rather than actual present earnings will thus be applied only "when
there is a deliberate attempt to avoid responsibilities by refusing to
42. 87 Cal. App. 2d at 692, 197 P.2d at 362-63.
43. 84 Cal. App. 2d 141, 190 P.2d 246 (1948).
44. Id. at 149-50, 190 P.2d at 251. The court also found that the rule of no impair-
ment was inapplicable, as the wife had income-producing separate property. Id.
45. W. HOGOBOOM, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, FAMILY LAW I § 6:89 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as W. HOGOBOOM].
46. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.15[2], 21-31.
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seek or accept gainful employment, deliberately not applying oneself
to business, intentionally depressing income to an artificial level, or
intentionally leaving employment to go into another business."47
In the case of Meagher v. Meagher,48 the court upheld an award of
$750.00 per month for alimony and child support where the husband
terminated his employment with earnings of $2,083.00 per month im-
mediately after leaving his family, and went to work elsewhere for
$624.05 per month.4 9 The trial court's rejection of evidence offered to
show a lack of financial ability has also been held to constitute re-
versible error.50 Hence, a practicing attorney should not only look
for signs of deliberate avoidance of support duties, but must also con-
sider the increased costs of maintaining two households on a salary
that once maintained only one family residence. Furthermore, the
burden of showing such avoidance, or rather bad faith, is borne by
the moving party, and has been deemed a difficult burden to carry in
everyday practice.
However, if the spouse seeking support meets the burden of show-
ing intentional reduction of income to avoid support, the ability to
pay determination must be made on the basis of ability to earn in-
come. The court may order support exceeding actual income of the
supporting spouse in this situation.51
Pendente lite (and permanent) spousal support awards are thus
proper only where the payor spouse has the financial ability to pro-
vide for the needs of the spouse requesting support.52 The court will
not focus solely on the earning ability of the supporting spouse in
terms of gross income, but will consider the effect of that spouse's ex-
penses for insurance premiums, social security deductions, retirement
contributions, and tax payments on his income potential.53
47. Id. The "proper procedure is to hold a so-called 'Philbin hearing,' where evi-
dence is taken on the issues of deliberate avoidance of financial responsibilities vs. eco-
nomic (or other) circumstances beyond the obligor-spouse's control." W. HOGOBOOM,
supra note 45, at § 6 90.1.
48. 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1961).
49. Id. at 63-65, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
50. Arnold v. Arnold, 215 Cal. 613, 614-15, 12 P.2d 435, 436 (1932).
51. But see In re Jennings, 133 Cal. App. 3d 373, 383, 184 Cal. Rptr. 53, 59 (1982)
(criminal contempt for failure to pay spousal support must be based on "ability to pay"
rather than "capacity to earn"); In re Marriage of Rome, 109 Cal. App. 3d 961, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 351 (1980) (trial court reversed for awarding support against non-working hus-
band based on a proven ability to earn and speculation of re-employment in the near
future).
52. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 117, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 73 (1974).
53. Id.
D. Agreements Between the Parties
Temporary support may be barred by an agreement between the
parties, thus divesting the court of the authority to make an award.
Provided that the agreement is fair, contains an express waiver of
any claim for temporary support, and is accepted by the court,
pendente lite support cannot be ordered. 54 However, where an agree-
ment between the parties is attacked for invalidity, or is not judi-
cially approved, an award of temporary support will not be
invalidated on appeal.55 Courts are wary of agreements purporting to
abrogate certain rights of the parties (e.g., waiver of spousal support),
and will approve them only if they appear fair and clearly set forth
the rights which a spouse may be giving up. The possibility of duress
or coercion is real in this situation, as one party may have stronger
bargaining power than the other due to financial position or other
such factors. Independent legal advice should be sought by a party
who has been asked to sign such an antenuptial agreement. This ju-
dicial insistence upon clarity and an express waiver of a statutorily
protected right (such as the right to spousal support) is consistent
with and firmly imbedded in the law of California. A court will not
hesitate to invalidate such agreements on equitable grounds such as
fraud where it appears that one spouse was "forced" into signing the
waiver of spousal support.56
In addition to agreements waiving spousal support entirely, the
parties may stipulate as to a definite amount of pendente lite spousal
support, and may enter into this stipulation orally in open court.57
By allowing oral stipulations in court, the judicial system undoubt-
edly encourages parties to settle their disputes amicably, thereby re-
ducing the cost of trying the matter before the court. This procedure
would seem to alleviate the need for proof of the supported spouse's
need and of the ability of the payor spouse to provide the support.
Stipulation is therefore a cost-saving measure to be encouraged in
clear-cut cases such as where the spouse seeking support has insuffi-
cient money for even the bare essentials of life.
54. Newhall v. Newhall, 157 Cal. App. 2d,786, 796, 321 P.2d 818, 824 (1958). There,
the court stated that the waiver in an agreement between husband and wife precludes
the wife from receiving temporary support, but child support would always be avail-
able to her. Id. See also Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal. 2d 520, 196 P.2d 909 (1948) (revers-
ible error to grant award of temporary alimony without considering the validity of the
property settlement agreement).
55. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 111 Cal. App. 2d 529, 533, 244 P.2d 917, 919 (1952). See
also Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977) (agree-
ment to waive child support not binding on the court).
56. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moore, 113 Cal. App. 3d 22, 169 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1980)
(agreement containing waiver of wife's right to spousal support set aside where evi-
dence that waiver was knowingly and intelligently made was lacking).
57. In re Marriage of Borson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635, 112 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434
(1974).
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E. Termination of Pendente Lite Support
Prior to July 1, 1984, temporary support terminated with the grant-
ing of the Interlocutory Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. Thus,
"[u]pon the interlocutory judgment becoming final, in the absence of
appeal, the right to temporary support is terminated. At that time
there must be an award of permanent support or the liability
ceases."'58 However, effective July 1, 1984, there is no longer an inter-
locutory judgment of dissolution.59 Instead, there is only a single
judgment in a divorce action, and that judgment operates to termi-
nate the obligation for pendente lite support. The single judgment
must set forth the obligations of the parties with regard to "perma-
nent" spousal support, or the court will be without jurisdiction to
award any support at a later time. Basically, the new single judg-
ment of dissolution replaces both the functions and effect of the in-
terlocutory judgment.6 0 Orders for support must be clearly and
specifically set forth in the judgment to also allow for effective en-
forcement of any such support order contained therein.
Obviously, a single judgment saves the parties, court, and attorneys
both time and money. The primary difference between the two
methods (interlocutory and single judgment) is that the former pro-
cess mandated that a formal "request to enter final judgment" be
filed after the interlocutory judgment and the six-month waiting pe-
riod, dating from the earliest of (1) the service of the initial papers in
the dissolution action or (2) the first appearance by the respondent.6 1
Such a "request" is no longer necessary in California. However, the
judgment is exactly the same in effect-it merely declares that the
parties are entitled to have their marriage dissolved. The exact date
(after the six-month waiting period) on which the judgment will be-
come "finally effective" must be specified in the judgment, otherwise
the parties will retain their pre-dissolution marital status for income
58. B. WITKIN, supra note 5, at § 135.
59. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4512, 4514 (West Supp. 1984).
60. W. HOGOBOOM, supra note 45, at § 15:57. The single judgment of dissolution is
a final and binding adjudication of the parties' property, custody, attorney's fees and
support rights. Id.
61. A judgment is deemed final if and when "six months have expired from the
date of service of a copy of summons and petition or the date of appearance by the
respondent, whichever occurs first." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514(a) (West 1983). But see
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514(e) (West 1983) ("court may ... ret.dn jurisdiction over the date
of termination . . .or may order . . .[the marriage] terminated at a future specified
date").
taxes, etc.62 Because this single judgment procedure eliminates the
"step" of having to file a request to enter the final judgment, there
will undoubtedly be some benefits to be gleaned therefrom. How-
ever, just how much time and/or money will actually be saved by the
parties and the courts cannot yet be determined.
Accordingly, pendente lite spousal support obligations terminate
upon the entry of the new final judgment. As previously stated, it is
vital to ensure that the judgment itself specifically disposes of all
matters before the court unless jurisdiction over some matters has
been bifurcated or reserved at a prior time.
F. Modification of Temporary Support
The power of the court to modify a temporary support order on a
showing of changed circumstances or subsequent events disclosing
excessiveness or inadequacy of the award is well established by case
law.63 The rule allowing modification of pendente lite spousal sup-
port is codified in Civil Code section 4357, which expressly prohibits
modification as to amounts already accrued.64 A modification may
thus only be made retroactive to the date of filing of the notice of
motion or order to show cause for modification. Once liable for past
due amounts, a party cannot exculpate himself by claiming that he
does not have the ability to pay amounts that have already become
due. Generally, the trial court, when making the original award, has
found that the spouse ordered to pay has the ability to pay the court-
ordered sums.
The California statute should serve as a model for other states to
follow. Its clarity and purpose are evident--only a spouse who has
duly applied to the court for modification and who can prove a
marked change in the circumstances of either party will be permitted
to have the orginal temporary support order modified.
The standard applied by the court in determining whether to mod-
ify or revoke a pendente lite spousal support order is identical to that
of the original or initial application for such order.65 Without a show-
62. W. HOGOBOOM, supra note 45, at 15:61-64. The date must, of course, conform
with the six month waiting period required by CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514(a) (West 1983).
63. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 173 Cal. App. 2d 455, 343 P.2d 299 (1959) (reduction
to amounts already paid); Howard v. Howard, 141 Cal. App. 2d 233, 296 P.2d 592 (1956)
(reduction by appellate court).
64. Civil Code section 4357 (effective July 6, 1970) provides in pertinent part: "Any
such order may be modified or revoked at any time except as to any amount that may
have accrued prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause
to modify or revoke." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4357 (West 1980).
65. Where the original order calls for payments on the first day of the month, the
monthly payments accrue on the first day, and a later order of modification cannot af-
fect any such payment or lack thereof. Hangen v. Hangen, 241 Cal. App. 2d 11, 13-14,
50 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (1966).
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ing of need and/or inability to pay the court-ordered amount, a party
cannot seek to modify the prior order for temporary spousal sup-
port.66 At this point, it should be noted that problems arise where
one party has appealed the original award of temporary support and
the other wishes to modify that same award during the pendency of
an appeal. This and other modification issue complexities will be
considered below in relation to "permanent" spousal support.6 7
G. Enforcement of Temporary Support Orders
Finally, enforcement of the temporary support order is governed
by California Civil Code section 4380.68 Former Civil Code section
140 expressly authorized the court to order the party required to pay
temporary spousal support to give security therefor.69 The Family
Law Act authorizes the court to order a party to post security for
payment only for permanent spousal and child support.70 Accord-
ingly, enforcement procedures must often be consulted to compel
compliance with temporary support orders.
Modernly, contempt for disobedience of a valid court order is the
remedy most often invoked to compel a spouse to pay spousal support
to the other. If the order could have been obeyed when made and
the spouse ordered to pay had knowledge of the order, disobedience
is punishable as contempt even though the party may subsequently
become unable to comply. 71 The duty to pay support is not regarded
as a debt, therefore the spouse that is in willful disobedience of a
valid court order may be jailed until compliance is secured. This pro-
vides incentive for the spouse who has not been receiving court-or-
dered support to utilize the contempt procedure for enforcement.
Furthermore, the bitterness inherent in most dissolution proceedings
between the parties is satisfied by the knowledge that one party may
be put in jail until he satisfies the obligations he owes to the other. It
should be remembered, however, that a frivolous contempt action
66. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.22.
67. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
68. That section provides as follows: "Any judgment, order, or decree of the court
made or entered pursuant to this part may be enforced by the court by execution, the
appointment of a receiver, contempt, or by such other order or orders as the court in
its discretion may from time to time deem necessary." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4380 (West
1983).
69. Repealed by 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, p. 3313 § 3 (operative January 1, 1970).
70. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1985). The language of Civil Code sec-
tion 4380, however, appears to allow a court to order the posting of security for the
support order in its discretion. See supra note 68.
71. Sorell v. 3uperior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 157, 161, 56 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225 (1967).
could bring with it a motion by the party opposing contempt for
sanctions.
In short, "[t]he temporary spousal support award is an attempt,
pending trial, to allocate the family income equitably between the
parties, considering their individual incomes and expenses." 72 A
spouse will be entitled to temporary spousal support pending the out-
come of the litigation if he or she can demonstrate a reasonable need
for support and that the other party has the ability to make pay-
ments. Although case-by-case determinations are costly and time
consuming for the parties, their attorneys, and the court, there is no
other "fair" way to determine the needs and abilities of the parties to
a divorce action.
The advent of a new single judgment in dissolution proceedings
should alleviate the duplicative nature of having both an interlocu-
tory and final judgment of dissolution. One must, however, provide
for support in the judgment, or face foreclosure upon subsequent ap-
plication therefor. The fact that courts are willing to allow and rec-
ognize stipulations as to temporary support between the parties is
indicative of the Family Law Act policy of reducing court time and of
allowing the parties to rationally and amicably resolve support issues.
California is clearly in the process of simplifying its domestic rela-
tions procedures, and the new amendments to the Civil Code are de-
fining the relevant issues to be determined in support proceedings.
III. "PERMANENT" SPOUSAL SUPPORT
A. Introduction
The grant or denial of permanent spousal support and its amount
and duration are matters that rest in the sound discretion of the trial
court.73 The word "permanent," in this context, means only that sup-
port is a result of the adjudication of the rights of the parties, and
serves to distinguish the "final," or permanent award of support,
from the pendente lite, or temporary award. Under former divorce
law in this state, permanent alimony was awarded to the wife for an
offense of the husband, as a substitute for the marital support she
lost through his fault.74 However, as stated in In re Rosan:75
[i]n determining the need for, the amount of and the duration of spousal sup-
port under The [sic] Family Law Act the court is to ignore marital fault and is
to base its determination solely on the circumstances of the parties, including
72. In re Marriage of Burlini, 143 Cal. App. 3d 65, 69, 191 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1983).
73. The trial court's discretion in ruling on these issues, although not unlimited, is
broad. In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 454, 573 P.2d 41, 52-53, 143 Cal. Rptr.
139, 150-51 (1978).
74. See Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 733, 72 P.2d 868 (1937); Scheibe v.
Scheibe, 57 Cal. App. 2d 336, 134 P.2d 835 (1943).
75. 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972).
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the duration of their marriage and the ability of the supported spouse to en-
gage in gainful employment.
7 6
Instead of considering fault, the courts must focus on more pragmatic
factors relating to these elusive "circumstances of the parties."
Thus, the enactment of the Family Law Act in 1969 did not change
the requirement that a court is to be guided by the circumstances of
the individual parties in resolving spousal support issues at trial.
77 It
is submitted that the Act and subsequent amendments to applicable
sections of the California Civil Code merely serve to more sharply
define what circumstances of the parties are deserving of considera-
tion, and which will be given weight.
The purpose of permanent spousal support in modern cases is not
to preserve the pre-separation status quo of the parties, but to pro-
vide financial assistance to the spouse in need of support.7 8 By pro-
viding financial aid to a spouse who has been supported in the past
for a period of time during the marriage, permanent spousal support
serves as a means to enable a spouse to become self-supporting. The
goal of eventual self-support for divorced spouses is presently being
judicially enforced through lower support awards for shorter
durations.
Fundamental differences exist between the functions and purposes
of pendente lite support and permanent support orders. First, the
court is governed by different statutory authority in making each
award.79 Second, the determination of permanent spousal support at
trial must be de novo, since only at trial is all the evidence presented
76. Id. at 892, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
77. In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 449, 573 P.2d 41, 49, 143 Cal. Rptr.
139, 147 (1978).
78. In re Marriage of Burlini, 143 Cal. App. 3d 65, 69, 191 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1983).
79. Civil Code § 4357 governs pendente lite support only. Civil Code § 4801(a),
governing permanent support, provides as follows:
(a) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage or a legal separa-
tion of the parties, the court may order a party to pay for the support of the
other party any amount, and for any period of time, as the court may deem
just and reasonable. In making the award, the court shall consider all of the
following circumstances of the respective parties:
(1) The earning capacity of each spouse, taking into account the extent to
which the supported spouse's present and future earning capacity is impaired
by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to per-
mit the supported spouse to devote time to domestic duties and the extent to
which the supported spouse contributed to the attainment of an education,
training, or a license by the other spouse.
(2) The needs of each party.
(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each.
(4) The duration of the marriage.
(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment with-
as to what the circumstances of the parties will be after the dissolu-
tion.80 Because the statute8 l expressly provides that the permanent
order is to be based upon circumstances existing at the date of trial, a
change of circumstances from the time the pendente lite order was
made is irrelevant to a determination of "just and reasonable" sup-
port at trial.8 2 Hence, courts do not and should not use the pendente
lite award as a standard in determining the amount of support to be
awarded at trial and to be set forth in the final judgment of
dissolution.
Prior to 1951, the husband could not receive permanent alimony in
a divorce action.8 3 The Family Law Act, however, does not distin-
guish between the spouses for purposes of deciding who is entitled to
an award of spousal support. Provided that a spouse definitely proves
a need for support, and that there are monies available to provide for
such support, it does not matter what the sex of the spouse seeking
support is.
In determining whether to award permanent support, and if so,
how much support and for how long, the court must consider all of
the statutory factors listed in California Civil Code section 4801(a). 84
out interfering with the interest of dependent children in the custody of the
spouse.
(6) The time required for the supported spouse to acquire appropriate educa-
tion, training, and employment.
(7) The age and health of the parties.
(8) The standard of living of the parties.
(9) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable.
At the request of either party, the court shall make appropriate factual de-
terminations with respect to the circumstances. The court may order the
party required to make the payment of support to give reasonable security
therefor. Any order for support of the other party may be modified or re-
voked as the court may deem necessary, except as to any amount that may
have accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to
show cause to modify or revoke. At the request of either party, the order of
modification or revocation shall include a statement of decision and may be
made retroactive to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show
cause to modify or revoke, or to any date subsequent thereto.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1985).
80. For a brief discussion of the fundamental differences between pendente lite
and permanent spousal support awards, see In re Marriage of McNaughton, 145 Cal.
App. 3d 845, 194 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1983).
81. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 79.
82. The former standard for the amount of spousal support under section 139 was
a "suitable allowance." The "just and reasonable" modern standard is equitably based
on the circumstances of the parties.
83. In that year, former Civil Code § 139 was amended to provide that the court
could compel an unsuccessful party to pay permanent alimony. See B. WITKIN, supra
note 5, at § 158. See also Kerr v. Kerr, 182 Cal. App. 2d 12, 5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960) (hus-
band granted divorce on extreme cruelty grounds awarded permanent support of
$65.00 per month).
84. Franson v. Franson, 142 Cal. App. 3d 419, 190 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1983) (abuse of
discretion to base support award solely on difference between expenses and income
without considering statutory standards). Section 4801(a) expressly provides that the
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In addition, the award must be based upon a review of all factors col-
lectively. Only after examining the factors as a whole can the court
order the "just and reasonable" support.
B. Earning Capacity
The first factor which must be considered by the court is the earn-
ing capacity of each spouse. As with temporary support, the inquiry
here will focus upon actual earnings, absent bad faith in the form of
intentional avoidance of support obligations, such as termination of
gainful employment. In that case, the court will consider the ability
of a party to earn income. 85 The court must examine the earning ca-
pacities of both spouses in order to make an equitable finding of need
for support in order to comply with the statutory mandate.
The earning capacity of the spouse seeking support, as affected by
time devoted during the marriage to homemaking services, is dis-
cussed in two comparatively recent California cases.8 6 Terminating
support at a fixed date after a lengthy marriage, where one spouse
stayed home to raise children and was not employed outside of the
home, would appear to be a clear abuse of discretion. A spouse who
has not had the opportunity to develop her earning capacity over a
period of years should not be "relegated to a standard of living sub-
stantially below that enjoyed by the parties during the marriage or to
subsistence from public welfare."8 7 Status quo considerations will
thus enter into the court's determination of the propriety of a sup-
port order on an informal, equitable level. When a dependent spouse
(i.e., a homemaker with some earning capacity) who might be capable
of earning income seeks spousal support, some courts tend to award
"step-down" spousal support.8 8 Such an award is one in which the
amount of the award is automatically reduced over the limited period
of time for which it is to be received. Step-down support orders pro-
vide valuable incentives for the supported spouse to become economi-
parties may request findings from the trial court. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West
Supp. 1985).
85. In re Marriage of Reese, 73 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125, 140 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1977).
86. In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 451, 573 P.2d 41, 50, 143 Cal. Rptr.
139, 148 (1978); In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 421, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638 (1977).
87. In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 897, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 304 (1972).
88. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672-73, 143 Cal. Rptr.
94, 97 (1978); In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 95, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259, 266
(1976). But see In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 423, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635,
639 (1977).
cally self-supporting and an increase in the use by the superior court
of this type of order should be expected.
California courts have examined several factors which affect the
earning capacity of the supporting spouse, including tax obligations,
insurance premiums, and retirement contributions.8 9 Absent bad
faith, the court will base the spousal support award on the husband's
actual income as of the date of trial.90 The action of In re Marriage
of Sullivan,91 recently decided by the California Supreme Court, may
have a bearing on the earning capacity factor. A spouse's education
and training have been deemed relevant in ascertaining a person's ca-
pability for generating income for spousal support purposes in an-
other jurisdiction.92 In addition, a California court has recognized
that the ability of each spouse to earn is relevant in Civil Code sec-
tion 4801(a) proceedings.93 However, because the California courts
appear to scrutinize earning capacity instead of actual earnings at
time of trial only where bad faith or fraud appears, and are mandated
by the Family Law Act to ignore fault, the education and profes-
sional degree of the husband may not be considered a valuable asset
bearing on the issue of need for spousal support in this state.
Finally, the Governor recently signed a bill which requires the
court to consider the need to reimburse a spouse for community con-
tributions to a spouse's education and training, and also mandates
that the extent to which a party contributed to the other's education
and training must be considered in awarding spousal support.94 This
law became effective on January 1, 1985, and applies to all cases in
which the final judgment for support has not been entered at that
time.95
89. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 116-17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58,
73 (1974), disapproved in In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 120, 573 P.2d 41, 143
Cal. Rptr. 139 (1978).
90. Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411-12 (1971). See
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
91. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1984). The court in Sullivan remanded to the trial court in order to make findings
necessary to determine reimbursement and/or support in accordance with a new Cali-
fornia statute, Civil Code section 4800.3. See infra note 95 for the text of section
4800.3.
92. Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 289, 497 P.2d 1006, 1009-10 (1972).
93. In re Marriage of Norton, 71 Cal. App. 3d 537, 541, 139 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730
(1976).
94. A.B. 3000 has been called the "Sullivan" Measure. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 2, 1984,
at 1, col. 2.
95. Section 4800.3 provides:
(a) As used in this section, "community contributions to education or train-
ing" means payments made with community property for education or train-
ing or for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or training.
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution of
marriage or legal separation:
(1) The community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to ed-
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In Philbin v. Philbin,96 a modification case, the court noted that
the rule requiring the court to inquire into the earning capacity of
the payor spouse is recognized only where no genuine effort to earn
income has been shown.97 It is therefore invalid for the spouse who
has stayed at home unemployed during the marriage to rest upon the
fact that he or she should not have to obtain employment or is un-
willing to enter the job market. Because the policy in California is to
promote self-sufficiency, unwillingness to earn income will be damag-
ucation or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity
of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate,
accruing from the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were
made.
(2) A loan incurred during the marriage for the education or training of a
party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for the pur-
pose of division pursuant to Section 4800 but shall be assigned for payment by
the party.
(c) The reimbursement and assignment required by this section shall be re-
duced or modified to the extent circumstances render such a disposition un-
just, including but not limited to any of the following:
(1) The community has substantially benefited from the education, training,
or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There is a rebutta-
ble presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that the community has not
substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or
training made less than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding,
and that the community has substantially benefited from community contri-
butions to the education or training made more than 10 years before the com-
mencement of the proceeding.
(2) The education or training received by the party is offset by the educa-
tion or training received by the other party for which community contribu-
tions have been made.
(3) The education or training enables the party receiving the education or
training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need
of the party for support that would otherwise be required.
(d) Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of loans
pursuant to this section is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party
for the education or training and any resulting enhancement of the earning
capacity of a party. However, nothing in this subdivision shall limit considera-
tion of the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the amount
reimbursed pursuant to this section, on the circumstances of the parties for
the purpose of an order for support pursuant to Section 4801.
(e) This section is subject to an express written agreement of the parties to
the contrary.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
96. 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1971). See supra note 47 and accompany-
ing text.
97. The Philbin court stated:
While it is true that an award of alimony and child support may be based
upon the husband's ability to earn as distinguished from his actual income, the
rule seems to be applied only when it appears from the record that there is a
deliberate attempt on the part of the husband to avoid his financial family re-
sponsibilities by refusing to seek or accept gainful employment. ...
lM at 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12 (citation omitted).
ing to a party's case. 9 8
In the future, state income tax returns may be required to be sub-
mitted to the court (not the opposing party), presumably to assist the
court in the determination of earning capacity as based on present in-
come. This requirement would be a novel one in family law proceed-
ings, but would result in more accurate orders.99
C. Reasonable Needs
The second determination to be made by the court is that of the
reasonable needs of each party. 100 Again, the needs of both spouses
must be considered, not just that of the party seeking a permanent
support award. Pope v. Pope'0o is an excellent illustration of the
court's discretionary bounds in determining what the actual needs of
the parties are. Although the general rule is to the contrary, there is
authority which states that the spouse's ability to live on the previ-
ously ordered pendente lite allowances may be considered by the
court when determining the amount of "permanent" support re-
quired by the moving party.102 "Need" should not be examined in a
vacuum, but must be analyzed in conjunction with the other relevant
circumstances and factors affecting the parties.103 If a spouse is capa-
ble of self-support sufficient to provide for her needs, support orders
are inappropriate. The wife's ability to work, including good faith ef-
forts to procure gainful employment after separation, are factors de-
serving consideration by the court in determining her need for
98. Civil Code section 4801(a) should, perhaps, provide that a spouse's unwilling-
ness to become self-supporting should be considered by the court. However, in view of
the ability of a spouse to request that the other undergo an examination by the voca-
tional training consultant, such a provision would merely serve to clarify what is al-
ready being considered by the courts of this state. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West
Supp. 1985).
99. "In any proceeding involving child support or spousal support, no party
thereto may refuse to submit . . . state income tax returns to the court .... CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4700.7 (West Supp. 1984), added by 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 1304 (operative July
1, 1984) (emphasis added).
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 79 and accom-
panying text.
101. 102 Cal. App. 2d 353, 227 P.2d 867 (1951). There, the wife had neither income
nor skills and alimony of $2,000.00 per month was upheld. Id. at 370-71, 227 P.2d at
878-79.
102. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 458-59, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668,
676 (1979), disapproved in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980); In re Marriage of Roesch, 83 Cal. App. 3d 96, 102-03, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 590 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979). One commentator has called the
non-permanent award of spousal support "rehabilitative," taking notice of the fact that
"the focal point of spousal support determinations has shifted from the sex of the re-
cipient to the individual's ability to become financially independent." Comment, Reha-
bilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating
Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L. REV. 493, 495 (1978).
103. W. HOGOBOOM, supra note 45, at § 6:93.
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support.1 0 4 In addition, need must be considered in relation to the
parties' post-separation situation, taking into consideration the practi-
cal problems such as maintaining more than one "family"
household.105
As in temporary support proceedings, the needs of each party must
amount to more than just the bare necessities, and generally entail a
comparison to the pre-separation status (social) of the parties. 0 6 Liv-
ing expenses and amounts sufficient to enable a spouse seeking sup-
port to become financially self-sufficient in relation to her position in
society, will thus be the key concerns in determining need.
D. Obligations and Assets
The third factor under Civil Code section 4801(a), the obligations
and assets, including the separate property, of each spouse, involves
an analysis of another statute-Civil Code section 4806.107 The lan-
guage of this latter statute is both discretionary and mandatory: if the
separate estate of the spouse seeking support is sufficient to provide
proper support, the court cannot make a support award where there
are no children of the marriage.
Fundamental fairness requires that a spouse should not receive
support unless there is a real, actual, and present need for financial
assistance. Case law interpreting the provisions of section 4806 is
sparse. Earlier cases, such as Dallman v. Dallman,1OS hold that, in
the absence of the requisite demonstration of need, a spouse's in-
104. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dennis, 35 Cal. App. 3d 279, 110 Cal. Rptr. 619
(1973). There, the marriage had lasted 25 years, and the controlling factor in the
court's award decreasing support on an annual basis was the wife's unwillingness to
work. Id. at 282, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
105. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Siegel, 26 Cal. App. 3d 88, 102 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1972).
See also In re Marriage of Andreen, 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1978) (abuse
of discretion to award spousal support of $500.00 per month for 10 years where the de-
cree pushed the wife's standard of living considerably below the husband's).
106. In re Marriage of Siegel, 26 Cal. App. 3d 88, 92, 102 Cal. Rptr. 613, 615 (1971).
107. Civil Code section 4806 provides as follows:
When either party in a proceeding under this part has either a separate estate,
or is earning his or her own livelihood, or there is community property or
quasi-community property sufficient to give him or her proper support, or if
the custody of the children has been awarded to the other party, who is sup-
porting them, the court may withhold any allowance to him out of the sepa-
rate property of the other party. In any original or modification proceeding,
where there are not children, and either party has or acquires a separate es-
tate, including income from employment, sufficient for his or her proper sup-
port, no support order shall be made or continued against the other party.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4806 (West 1983) (emphasis added).
108. 170 Cal. App. 2d 729, 339 P.2d 636 (1959).
come-producing separate property precludes an award of spousal sup-
port.109 Such cases appear to be contrary to the general policy of
preventing diminution of a party's own property when there is com-
munity property available for support.
The most recent case interpreting the sufficient separate property
income requirement of section 4806, In re Marriage of McNaugh-
ton,110 held that section 4806 is applicable only when the supported
spouse's income from separate property is sufficient to meet that
spouse's needs."'1 Hence, where a spouse has a separate estate which
is income-producing, the requirement of sufficient proof of need in
excess of income will become the determinative factor regarding the
propriety of a support order. Provided the spouse's needs exceed in-
come from all sources, including that from separate property, that
spouse should be entitled to receive permanent spousal support in an
amount sufficient to provide for all of her needs.
The McNaughton1l2 interpretation of section 4806 is much more re-
alistic and fair than that of earlier case law. Mere possession and
control of separate property assets, whether or not income-producing,
should not preclude the spouse seeking legitimate support funding
where the other spouse objects. After all, support is primarily based
on need, and a party may have a need for support in excess of the
income received from separate property. Liquidation should not be
required of the spouse seeking support as the only remedy upon
dissolution.
In addition, speculation as to the ultimate amount of income avail-
able to a spouse from a division of community property or from sepa-
rate property should be discouraged. In situations where the spouse
from whom support is requested suggests that the parties divide com-
munity property in order to allow the supported spouse to have suffi-
cient income pending the full division of the marital property, this
policy becomes relevant. There must, therefore, be proof of the
amount of income that a spouse receives from separate property.
The fact that one spouse received non-income-producing assets in
the division of property may properly be considered in determining
the adequacy of a support award.113 A request for such non-liquid as-
109. Id. at 739, 339 P.2d at 642. See also In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27 Cal. App. 3d
424, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1972) (wife denied support where evidence showed income
from her separate property approximated her living expenses).
110. 145 Cal. App. 3d 845, 194 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1983).
111. Id. at 853, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 178. The circumstances at trial are the only truly
relevant circumstances as to both the needs of the parties and of the income available
to them, including income from the division of community property.
112. Id.
113. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.32[2](3). The fact that the spouse requested
non-income-producing property may also be important for purposes of considering mo-
tive or bad faith. Id.
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sets may be indicative of a plan to receive support in excess of income
that could be earned had that spouse requested and received property
which would and could provide sufficient support. Motive may thus
become another "informal" factor considered by the court under the
obligations and asset determination.
The paying spouse's obligations and assets are also considered
under this section, as they tend to reflect the actual ability of that
spouse to pay support to the other. However, to permit that spouse
to escape his support obligations because his funds are tied up, or be-
cause he has little or no "cash" available would result in the sup-
ported spouse's paying for her share of the community property out
of support money that would otherwise have been awarded.114 The
policy requiring an equal division of community property upon disso-
lution thus may serve as an impetus for the court to find that a
spouse's needs exceed income, and resulting awards of support will
be made despite income from separate or community property other-
wise sufficient to provide support.
A spouse who seeks division of community property in lieu of sup-
port, or support payable from community property prior to the divi-
sion thereof should be required to reimburse the community if he
would have been responsible for paying the support out of his sepa-
rate property or post-separation earnings. 11 5 This result would be in
accord with the legislative mandate of a completely equal distribution
of community assets and obligations upon dissolution.
E. Duration of the Marriage
The fourth factor, duration of the marriage, bears upon both the
need for support and the duration of any award which may be made
by the courts. As previously stated, a spouse who has stayed out of
the job market for an extended period of time in order to fulfill fam-
ily obligations, such as the care of children and maintenance of the
family residence, may not be able to quickly enter into an employ-
ment relation upon separation or dissolution. It is often noted that
114. To permit this "would be to distort the statutory scheme and, indirectly, con-
travene the statutory mandate that the community property be divided equally." In re
Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 895 n.5, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 302 n.5 (1972).
115. California Civil Code section 4805 provides that the "earnings, income, or accu-
mulations of either spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse,
which would have been community property if the spouse had not been living separate
and apart from the other spouse..." shall be the primary source for spousal support
payments. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4805 (West 1983).
"the longer the marriage, the stronger is the case in favor of granting
spousal support."116
In some cases, a "displaced homemaker" may never be able to ade-
quately provide for her needs after a lengthy marriage. As in In re
Marriage of Brantner,1i7 a wife who has spent her married years as a
homemaker and mother may, despite good faith attempts, find it im-
possible to reenter the job market. "[T]he husband simply has to face
up to the fact that his support responsibilities are going to be of ex-
tended duration-perhaps for life. This has nothing to do with femi-
nism, sexism, male chauvinism. . . . It is ordinary commonsense,
basic decency and simple justice."11s
Hence, one spouse cannot force the other spouse to enter the job
market by refusing to pay spousal support where such action would
be futile, The same is true, of course, for a husband whose wife has
pursued a career while he has devoted his time to raising the chil-
dren and maintaining the family home. In view of the fact that today
more women work outside of the home and care for their children,
spousal support awards may be decreasing.11 9 Each case must, how-
ever, be considered on its own facts, and the duration of the marriage
may have affected the ability of one or both of the spouses to earn
income, thus necessitating the extension of the duration of a "perma-
nent" spousal support order.
Problems arise with regard to determining exactly what constitutes
the required duration of a marriage. There are no cases which have
examined this issue, although dicta on various marriage terms is
plentiful. One judge, for example, has defined long-term marriages
as those lasting for more than fifteen years, middle-term marriages
as those lasting from seven to fifteen years, and short-term marriages
as those lasting less than seven years. 20 However, in In re Marriage
of Vomacka,121 the court found that eleven years was a lengthy mar-
riage in allowing modification of a support order.122
If one spouse has little or no ability to earn income due to the
length of the marriage and its negative effect on employability, then
a support order would recognize the need for support for an ex-
116. C.MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.32[2](4). See also W. HOGOBOOM, supra note
45, at § 6:95.
117. 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977).
118. Id. at 421, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
119. See generally The Alimony Myth, supra note 1, at 154-59, regarding short and
long term marriages and resulting support awards.
120. D. KING, GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES 14-15 (1977).
121. 36 Cal. 3d 459, 683 P.2d 248, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1984).
122. Id. at 469, 683 P.2d at 254, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 574. See also In re Marriage of
Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 847, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157, 164 (1979) (a marriage lasting seven
years was "lengthy" as a matter of law). See infra note 149 and accompanying text for
the impact of this case on future modification of spousal support issues.
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tended and indefinite period of time.123 In such a case, it is essential
for the practicing attorney to insure that the court specifically retains
jurisdiction to modify the award in the future.
F Ability of Supported Spouse to Obtain Employment
The fifth factor under Civil Code section 4801(a) 124 turns on the
ability of the supported spouse to be employed without interfering
with the interests of dependent children in her custody. The needs of
young children, a legitimate state interest, have been held to justify
support of indefinite duration even after a relatively short mar-
riage.125 However, surveys have indicated that the mothers of young
children who were divorced after short marriages experienced a dra-
matic decline in spousal support between 1968 and 1972.126 One rea-
son advanced for this decline in support awards is that spousal
support may be subsumed under child support awards.127 A more
plausible reason is that women have become increasingly more self-
sufficient in recent years. It appears that the California legislature,
in enacting the Family Law Act, expected that courts would issue or-
ders encouraging supported spouses to seek job opportunities and to
work toward a goal of eventual self-support.12s
G. Time to Acquire Education and Employment
Another circumstance to be considered in the determination of the
amount of, need for, and duration of spousal support is the time that
is required for the supported spouse to obtain appropriate education,
training and employment. 129 By using the word "appropriate," the
statute necessarily contemplates that each case will be considered in
relation to its own facts. This provision basically orders the spouse
seeking support to prepare for employment, and reduces the chance
that a spouse will claim that she should not have to become self-sup-
porting. Case law intrepreting this factor indicates that if the sup-
123. See In re Marriage of Brantner, 62 Cal. App. 3d 416, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977).
124. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
125. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 67 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
126. The Alimony Myth, supra note 1, at 164.
127. Id. However, the wife is not allowed use of the funds as her own-she must
use the money for the interests of the children of the marriage.
128. In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 451, 573 P.2d 41, 50, 143 Cal. Rptr.
139, 148 (1978). Speculation as to future self-support, however, will mandate that the
spouse continue to receive support. In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 91, 592
P.2d 1165, 1174, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 422 (1979).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 79.
ported spouse does have job skills, then she may not need a support
order.130 If support is in fact ordered by a court under facts revealing
that the spouse receiving it could obtain employment, it will gener-
ally be for a shorter duration. Housewives with no job skills, other
than as a homemaker or cleaning woman, however, are entitled to
support for an extended period of time.131
During the pendency of section 4801 support proceedings, the court
is empowered to order a party to submit to an examination conducted
by a "vocational training consultant."132 The purpose of the inter-
view is to provide the court with a benchmark to determine the true
amount of training or experience the party seeking support already
has or will need before she will be able to obtain "gainful" employ-
ment. Like an expert witness, the vocational training consultant, and
any reports prepared by her, aid and assist the court in examining
the earning capacity and the time required to acquire skills and ap-
propriate employment. Support will generally be awarded for the pe-
riod of time found by the consultant, unless it is unusually
speculative.133 Furthermore, the findings of the vocational consultant
may be used to reduce the amount of support awarded to a spouse
who is unwilling, yet capable, of entering the job market. To insure
that the goal of a self-supporting society is reached, provisions such
as this examination serve to remind unwilling workers that there are
no free rides.
The use of vocational consultants may be beneficial in providing a
spouse, who has not been in the job market for a number of years,
with encouragement and advice. However, it appears that the experi-
ence of having one spouse "force" the other to submit to an interview
with the consultant, by asking the court to order the examination, is
not a pleasant one. One should expect that some clients may be un-
willing to meet with a vocational consultant. The examination, how-
ever, should be encouraged by counsel because it will better enable a
spouse to achieve self-sufficiency through increased knowledge of her
skills and employment opportunities.
H. The Age and Health of the Parties
The court must also consider the age and health of both parties in
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 419, 136 Cal. Rptr.
635, 637 (1977).
131. See id. at 419, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 637. Accordingly, support may truly be "perma-
nent" in such cases.
132. Civil Code § 4801(e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "In any proceeding
under this section the court may order a party to submit to an examination by a voca-
tional training consultant." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(e) (West Supp. 1985).
133. Speculation of future ability to become self-supporting seems to be the major
concern of the California courts. If there is doubt regarding the ability of the sup-
ported spouse to become self-sufficient, an indefinite award of support is likely.
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support proceedings.134 Previously, our courts did implicitly consider
these factors when reviewing the totality of the parties' circum-
stances. For example, in In re Marriage of Andreen,135 an award of
$500.00 per month in support was held to be an abuse of discretion.136
The court considered that the wife "had some physical problems (re-
current bursitis and arthritis) which might interfere with her em-
ployment expectations," and was entering the employment market at
age fifty.137 The age and health of the spouse seeking support is thus
relevant to the questions of ability to become self-supporting and
need for support. On the other hand, the husband's age and health
relates to his ability to provide the requested and/or proper support.
A denial of support to the wife has thus been upheld where the hus-
band was disabled and the wife, seven years his junior, was in good
health.138
Case law has established the general principle that "[t]he older the
spouse seeking support is and the poorer her or his health, the
greater the need for a spousal support award."'139 It is submitted that
the employment opportunities in relation to the locality of the par-
ties must be ccnsidered in conjunction with the age and health of the
parties (as an "informal" factor) to insure that speculative need and
ability findings by the court are kept to a minimum. The opportuni-
ties within the locale of the parties will demonstrate whether the
spouse, because of her age or good health, will be able to support
herself.
In addition to other factors which the court may deem "just and
equitable," Civil Code section 4801(a) directs the court to consider the
standard of living of the parties in determining permanent spousal
134. The language of the statute is mandatory. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(7) (West
Supp. 1985). See supra note 79.
135. 76 Cal. App. 3d 667, 143 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1978).
136. Id. at 672, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The court felt that the wife needed more.
137. Id. at 673, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The wife had also shown no unwillingness to
obtain employment, and in fact expected to become a secretary after appropriate
training.
138. In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 222, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353
(1979). For other cases discussing the age and health of the parties in relation to sup-
port issues, see In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1977) (wives' ages made ability to enter job market competitively too speculative); In
re Marriage of Holmgren, 60 Cal. App. 3d 869, 130 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1976) (wife had medi-
cal ailments and was receiving psychiatric care); In re Marriage of Dennis, 35 Cal. App.
3d 279, 110 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1973) (wife's eyesight may affect employment opportunities
necessitating retained jurisdiction regarding support).
139. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 221.32[2](7).
support awards.140 Unlike pendente lite support issues, this factor is
determined de novo at the time of the trial and considers the effects
of the post-division of community property on the parties' standard of
living. In general, "[t]he higher standard of living of the spouses and
the lower the ability of the supported spouse to maintain that stan-
dard without help from the other spouse, the greater is the need for a
support award."141 In In re Marriage of Wright,142 for example, the
court upheld an award of $2,000.00 per month to the wife where she
had received custody of the parties' four children, there was a modest
amount of community property accumulated during a lengthy mar-
riage, the husband earned between $100,000.00 and $200,000.00 per
year, and the parties had enjoyed a "free-spending" lifestyle.143
Finally, other factors which may be considered by the court under
this catch-all subsection are the non-marital relationship of the sup-
ported spouse (including cohabitation),144 and the paying spouse's
history of disobedience to court-ordered support decrees.145 Again,
these factors must be considered together, and seen as the totality of
the "circumstances of the parties" by which the court must be
guided. Only then can a court make a fair determination of what, if
any, spousal support should the party requesting it receive.
I. Modification and Termination of Support Orders
It is well-established that a court cannot award support to a spouse
after a final judgment of dissolution has been entered, or extend du-
ration of the support obligation after expiration of its original order,
unless it has expressly reserved jurisdiction to modify, revoke, or ter-
minate the support obligations of the parties.146 Typically, continu-
ing jurisdiction is effected by an "until further order of this court"
clause. Specifically, the court should not terminate jurisdiction to ex-
tend future support after a lengthy marriage unless the record
clearly indicates that the supported spouse will be able to adequately
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(8) (West Supp. 1985).
141. C. MARKEY, supra note 15, at § 21.32[2](8).
142. 60 Cal. App. 3d 253, 131 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1976).
143. Id. at 259, 131 Cal. Rptr at 872 (1976).
144. In re Marriage of Leib, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978). "[T]he
services of a homemaker, housekeeper, cook and companion who has demonstrated
competence to the recipient of such services. . . have a reasonable market value .... "
Id. at 642-43, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 770. Thus, the court found that a wife who cohabited
after dissolution had a decreased need for support in modification proceeding brought
by husband. Id. at 644, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
145. See In re Marriage of Stalcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1979).
146. Civil Code § 4801(d) provides as follows:
(d) Termination at end of fixed period. An order for payment of an allowance
for the support of one of the parties shall terminate at the end of the period
specified in the order and shall not be extended unless the court in its original
order retains jurisdiction.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(d) (West Supp. 1985).
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meet her financial needs at the date set for expiration of the order.147
The reservation of jurisdiction has been traditionally inferred from
step-down orders, wherein the obligation is reduced to a nominal sum
(typically $1.00 per month or year) after a certain number of years.148
In the past, the courts have favored the retention of jurisdiction over
spousal support awards in judgments containing ambiguous language.
Hence, the practitioner should be careful to scrutinize orders for a
fixed period which has been designated as the complete termination
of jurisdiction to award spousal support on a specified date.
In July, 1984, the California Supreme Court rendered an opinion in
the case entitled In re Marriage of Vomacka.149 The court held that
a trial court does have fundamental jurisdiction to extend spousal
support payments past a date it has designated as terminating the
right of the supported spouse to "request" such payments. 15 0 Citing
In re Marriage of Morrison,15 1 the court noted that Civil Code sec-
tion 4801(d) "was enacted to insure notice to the parties of a marital
dissolution whether, and for what period of time, a court retains ju-
risdiction to make subsequent orders extending spousal support."'1 5 2
The Vomacka court found that the language of the parties' interlocu-
tory judgment regarding termination of the wife's "right to request
spousal support" necessarily included extension of support. 5 3 Since
the wife sought extension of support prior to the termination date
contained in the judgment, she was entitled to relief. It appears that
the Vomacka opinion makes mandatory the policy stated in In re
Marriage of Moore'5 4 -- that "where there is an ambiguity in the lan-
guage of a marital property agreement [incorporated into the judg-
147. In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 150 (1978).
148. W. HOGOBOOM, supra note 45, at § 6:139.
149. 36 Cal. 3d 459, 683 P.2d 248, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1984). Justice Mosk, with Jus-
tice Broussard concurring, dissented. Id. at 475-76, 683 P.2d at 258-59, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
578-79.
150. Id. at 461, 683 P.2d at 248-49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
151. 20 Cal. 3d 437, 573 P.2d 41, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1978). Morrison is the leading
case on the subject of modification of spousal support pursuant to Civil Code section
4801(d).
152. Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d at 467, 683 P.2d at 252, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
153. Id. at 474, 683 P.2d at 257, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The court thus rejected the
husband's argument that the clearly stated preference for clarity in clauses retaining
or terminating jurisdiction to extend support in In re Marriage of Maxfield, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 755, 191 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1983), precluded interpretation of an ambiguous sup-
port order to permit extension thereof.
154. 113 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29, 169 Cal. Rptr. 619, 622 (1980).
ment] it must be decided in favor of the right to spousal support."155
Clarity, with regard to the termination of spousal support obligations,
has thus become a necessity under California law.
Although the California courts are enforcing the policy favoring
self-sufficiency by making generally smaller awards for more limited
durations, California still maintains that an order absolutely termi-
nating spousal support is disfavored.156 Such orders, particularly
with respect to lengthy marriages, will be upheld only if the record
clearly reveals that the wife will be financially self-sufficient on the
date of termination. Thus, permanent spousal support will continue
to provide divorced spouses with financial aid until such time as they
have, in fact, become self-supporting.
The question of whether a spouse, who has been awarded spousal
support, can enforce or modify her order when either of the parties
has appealed the order has long plagued the California courts. In
Fontana v. Superior Court,5 7 the court held that if the supported
spouse appeals the whole judgment, she cannot enforce any part of it
during the pendency of the appeal. If the spouse obligated to pay
spousal support appeals the award, execution will not, however, be
stayed unless a bond is posted, which is usually in the amount equal
to double the total sum of support that would become due during the
pendency of the appeal.158
On August 21, 1984, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Division,
issued an opinion entitled In re Marriage of Horowitz (Horowitz
11).159 There, the court held that, on a showing of changed circum-
stances, the trial court can modify spousal support despite a pending
appeal. The trial court's modification upon the showing that the
wife's need for support had decreased was upheld in part because the
parties' property division had been reversed.16 0 Thus, the court
found that:
Modification of the trial judge's order for child or spousal support while the
issue of validity of that amount is on appeal, when based upon a change of cir-
cumstances justifying a change in amount, does not interfere with the jurisdic-
tion of the appellate court, since its review is based upon the record at
trial.1 6 1
Allowing modification on appeal is a dramatic new twist in California
155. Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d at 469, 683 P.2d at 254, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 574 (citing Moore,
113 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 622).
156. Id. at 468, 683 P.2d at 253, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
157. 72 Cal. App. 3d 159, 139 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1977).
158. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 916(a), 917.1 (West Supp. 1984).
159. 159 Cal. App. 3d 377, 205 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1984).
160. Id. at 385, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
161. Id. The wife's mother had died, relieving her of an annuity debt and giving
her access to additional funds. These facts were found sufficient to constitute the
changed circumstances necessary for modification of a support order.
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law, and we should expect that the new rule may be applied in other
areas, such as child support.
III. CONCLUSION
The modern trend in California spousal support cases is to limit
the amount of support and its duration to a time sufficient to enable
the supported spouse to become self-supporting. In most cases, how-
ever, an absolute termination of jurisdiciton to extend or modify
spousal support in the future will be an abuse of discretion. These
policies are in accord with the legislative history of the relevant sec-
tions of the California Civil Code. Under no circumstances will sup-
port be awarded to a spouse who does not, or cannot, demonstrate
sufficient need for spousal support. Each of the factors discussed
herein must be examined in relation to the others-no one factor, in
itself, is controlling on the issue of need.
The mandatory language in Civil Code section 4806, which prohib-
its the court from awarding support in a childless marriage where
one spouse has sufficient income for support (whether from separate
property or from a disbursement of community property) indicates a
movement toward a more restrictive conception of what constitutes
sufficient need to entitle a spouse to receive spousal support for a
limited time. Only in the rarest of circumstances will a spouse be
able to receive support for an indefinite period of time. As specula-
tion regarding the length of time necessary to become self-supporting
decreases, so will spousal support awards.
Currently, California is attempting to simplify the process of ob-
taining a dissolution of marriage, and to reduce the astronomical
costs of divorce proceedings. The courts and attorneys will find that
the abolishment of the interlocutory judgment brings with it fewer
papers to read, file, and shuffle. This simplified process will also de-
crease attorney's fees for parties who contest issues in dissolution
proceedings. Spousal support is on the wane in California and will
continue only where there is no assurance that a given spouse will be
able to find employment in the future.
SARAH J. HOOVER

